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ABSTRACT 
In a horizontally differentiated goods market, where consumers face heterogeneous costs of entering the market and 
exhibit a taste for variety (via CES preferences) over the continuum of substitute goods, lowering the general market 
price level leads to increased consumer entry—the market expansion effect. Since atomistic competitors (each supply- 
ing 1 good) cannot influence this general price level, whilst a (multi-product) monopolist can, monopoly may lead to 
lower prices. In a model where market expansion effects are potentially large, the paper shows how monopoly leads to 
socially desirable lower prices, and greater variety, even when goods are arbitrarily close substitutes. 
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1. Introduction 
An elementary result in microeconomics is that, for a 
market where firms produce a homogeneous good at con- 
stant, symmetric marginal cost, monopoly leads to higher 
prices and a less socially desirable outcome than perfect 
competition amongst a large number of (atomistic) firms. 
In what follows these elementary conclusions are re- 
versed—monopoly offers lower prices and the socially 
better outcome—in a model with constant, symmetric 
marginal production costs, and where goods are not quite 
homogeneous but slightly differentiated in the eyes of 
consumers who have a taste for variety. 
To be more precise, a market where a continuum of 
horizontally differentiated goods is studied. In this model 
the goods on offer are imperfect substitutes and all goods 
are produced at the same constant marginal cost. The 
performance of (multi-product) monopoly provision of 
the goods with that of atomistic (monopolistic) compete- 
tion is then compared. Consumers face (heterogeneous) 
costs of accessing the market and when shopping they 
exhibit a taste for variety via CES preferences. Lowering 
of the general price level on the market thus leads to a 
market expansion effect, the number of entering consum- 
ers increasing. But, whilst individual atomistic compete- 
tors are too small to affect the general price level, this is 
not so for the monopolist, who may therefore set lower 
prices in a socially preferable way. 
The general idea of the last paragraph is quite well- 
known, as discussed below. The contribution of this note 
is to provide a model with sufficiently large market ex-
pansion effects that the desirability of monopoly survives 
to markets where goods are arbitrarily close substitutes. 
The demonstration is provided both for a short-run model, 
where the number of goods on offer is fixed, and a long- 
run model where monopoly has a further desirable im- 
pact on the extent of variety on offer. 
The idea in the second paragraph can be found in Stahl 
[1], Smith and Hay [2], and Nocke et al. [3]. In [1] con- 
sumers have a quadratic utility function defined over the 
2 varieties available, and monopoly provision of the 2 
goods leads to lower prices than duopoly, provided goods 
are not too close substitutes. Reference [2] provides a 
number of comparisons between multi-product monopoly 
(supermarket) and other market forms, their High Street 
alternative equating to the atomistic competition pre- 
sented here; again lower monopoly prices can emerge in 
their setting, where goods are independent (i.e. on the 
border between substitutes and complements). In the ter- 
minology of [3], the market is a platform where consum- 
ers gain access to a variety of products and the compare- 
son that follows in this paper is between open integrated 
platform ownership (atomistic competition) and mono- 
poly integrated platform ownership. The latter is not 
studied in [3]—see p. 1150—and, again in their termi- 
nology, our CES example shows how large market ex- 
pansion effects can always produce strong platform ef- 
fects, and the desirability of the monopoly ownership; the 
CES examples in [3] pertaining to other comparisons  
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also produce strong platform effects, if goods are suffi- 
ciently complementary. To demonstrate the importance 
of market expansion effects Peng [4] considers a spatial 
monopolist and their ability to determine market size 
when consumer access cost is a linear function, although 
no attempt is made to study the atomistic alternative. Re- 
ference [4] is thus analogous to a special case of the mo- 
nopolist discussed here. 
Focus on multi-product purchase, of the type studied 
in this note, is limited however. There is a related litera- 
ture which studies the role of product search in deter- 
mining which provision method is socially optimal. Se- 
minal works in this setting are Schulz [5] and Schulz and 
Stahl [6]. They find that the incentive to offer a consumer 
their preferred variety can cause a monopolist to offer a 
greater product range from the full set of possible varie- 
ties desired by shoppers. Anderson and Renault [7] find 
that a strong preference for variety can cause prices to 
fall as competition increases, but that this only serves to 
partially counter the search effect. As this paper consi- 
ders multiple products the results from search theory 
serve as a reference point only. 
A second related literature is in the area of product 
bundling. Chen and Riordan [8] find that a multiproduct 
monopolist will set a higher price than two competing 
firms when it sells both of the goods that are sold by the 
duopolists to consumers who want both goods. Here it is 
the internalizing of the effect of one product on demand 
for the other that generates the result. Davis and Murphy 
[9] is among a series of papers which apply these ideas to 
anti-trust cases. Specifically in [9] the case studied of 
Microsoft and its decision to bundle Internet Explorer 
with its’ Windows operating platform. Following the 
result of [8] it is shown that the monopoly provision 
harms consumer welfare. Although many effects from 
this area can transfer to the multi-product setting, the 
suggested welfare results of [8,9] do not apply here. 
Section 2 sets out the short-run model and Section 3 
the long-run model. Section 4 then compares the result- 
ing equilibrium from each provision method with the 
social optimum. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The Short-Run Model 
There is a continuum of goods  0, n
p i q
 available in the 
market. If i  denotes the price of good  and i  the 
quantity of good  consumed by a consumer entering 
the market, the consumer’s utility is of the following 
quasi-linear, symmetric CES form1; 
i
  1
0 0
d d
v
n n
i i ii p q i
     tU x y x q
    
Here x  is the consumer’s heterogeneity parameterand 
 is the consumer’s income (or numeraire endowment). 
 would also be the consumer’s utility if the market 
was not entered. It is assumed  is large enough to 
never prevent a potential consumer from entering the  
y
y
y
market. If they enter, the access cost is 
1
tx  where   0t 
and x  is uniformly distributed on . On entering 
the market the consumer purchases generate net utility 
corresponding to the last 2 terms in U x , where 
 0,
( ) , 0,1v   v, and    0,1 
v
.  implies goods are 
always net substitutes, and (as is seen in (2) below) 
 
( )
p
i
q i
iq
 implies they are also gross substitutes. As usual, 
the quasi-linear form chosen for U x  legitimizes the 
use of consumer surplus as a welfare measure. 
Suppose  is the price of all goods apart from good 
. Any consumer entering the market will buy quantities 
derived from the following first-order conditions defin-
ing the desired  (for each good other than good ) 
and ; 
1
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Thus, a consumer with heterogeneity parameter x who 
enters the market would have utility;  
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     (3) 
The consumer would in fact enter the market if this 
exceeds , so the market size at price  (i.e. the mass 
of entering consumers, denoted ) will be the x  
thatequates the right hand side of Equation (3) to y; 
 
 
 
1
1
(1 ) 1
vtv t
vtv vm p n v



       
( )m p p i
       (4) 
Notice that  does not depend on i , since  
is negligible. Notice also that market size is, naturally, 
2From Equation (2) 1In Rudkin [10] the author provides a similar analysis to here, with 
quadratic rather than CES utility. 
0iQ p and goods are gross substitutes iff   
v , as remarked earlier.  
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decreasing in , and the size of the market expansion 
effect as  falls can be measured by the (absolute value 
of the) elasticity of with respect to , namely 
p
p
( )m p p
1
vt
 v  0,v; in particular, for any given  , the market 
expansion effect will range in size from 0 to   as t 
increases from 0 to . Letting  denote ag-
gregate consumer demand for each good other than i, and 
i i  the corresponding demand for good i, it 
follows from Equations (1), (2) and (4) that; 
 ( )m p
Q q
Q q
( )m p
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where 
1
v
 
1
v vt  


          (7) 
Consider first atomistic provision in which each good i 
is provided by an independent profit-maximizing firm, 0,i
0c 
p
n . These firms produce their particular product 
variety at constant marginal cost  to meet the de-
sired consumer demand. They select a price i  in order 
to maximise their profits. If all other firms choose the 
price p, the profit of firm i is; 
    ic Qπ ,i ip p ip   
Using Equation (6), π c πi i  has the sign of i i  which equals 0 when  1  p p  ip c  π. i  
is increasing to the left of this stationary point, and de-
creasing to its right, and thus the stationary point is the 
global profit maximum for all firms. Hence Ap c   
is the short-run equilibrium price under atomistic compe-
tition. Of course, Ap c   is also the familiar expres-
sion for equilibrium under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
competition with CES preferences; notice that it does not 
depend on n. 
Now consider multi-product monopoly provision of 
the goods  0, n
0c 
 p p c nQ 
 in which each good continues to be 
produced at constant marginal cost . It is assumed 
that the monopolist meets the desired consumer demands. 
Given the symmetry of preferences and demands for the 
goods, the monopolist will set a symmetric price p for all 
goods, generating demands given by Equation (5) for 
each good. The monopolist’s profit from the sale of the n 
goods is; 
 π  
π p   has the sign of  1
1
p cvtp
v
   which equals 
0 when 1M
vtp c
v vt
  π.  is increasing to the left of 
this stationary point, and decreasing to its right, and so 
1
M
vtp c
v vt
   is the global profit maximum for the mo- 
nopolist. Thus Mp
p
p p
,p p
 
 is the short-run equilibrium price 
under monopoly, and again this does not depend on n. 
Notice that the individual firm under atomistic compe- 
tition cannot influence market size (which depends on p 
but not i ), whereas the monopolist is large enough to 
be aware that reductions in their goods’ price will expand 
the market. For this reason it is possible that A M , a 
possibility which is easily confirmed (using the previous 
formulae for A M ) when the size of the market ex-
pansion effect is sufficiently large; 
1
vt
v


 
0
                (8) 
Now Equation (8) holds if and only if    so that 
  (which is increasing in ) becomes an alternative 
measure of the size of the market expansion effect, from 
now on 
t
  will be used to measure this effect. 
The following summarises findings so far; 
Proposition 1. For any with    2, 0,1v  v  , 
and thus in particular for a market where goods are arbi-
trarily close substitutes (   close to 1), the short-run 
equilibrium price under atomistic competition  
( 1M
vtp c
v vt
  ) exceeds that under monopoly  
( 1M
vtp c
v vt
 
0
) if and only if the size of the market ex- 
pansion effect is sufficiently large (   ). 
It is worth remarking that the exposited short-run 
model inverts the slope ranking of the DD and dd curves 
in the familiar textbook Chamberlin diagram. In that dia-
gram, the firms in a monopolistically competitive indus-
try produce substitute goods but without market expan-
sion effects; the DD curve indicates demand per firm if 
all firms (say) lower price and is naturally steeper than 
the dd curve which indicates demand for just one firm 
that lowers price. In our model, the market expansion 
effect kicks in when all firms lower price, and causes DD 
to flatten and become less steep than dd. 
When the atomistic competition price exceeds the 
monopoly price the welfare consequences are immediate. 
First, consumers who enter the atomistic market are also 
in the monopoly market and are made better off by the 
lower monopoly price; the lower monopoly price causes 
new consumers to enter, who are also better off under 
monopoly; and the remaining consumers enter neither 
market and are indifferent. Monopoly is Pareto superior 
to atomistic competition for consumers, and aggregate 
consumer surplus is certainly higher under monopoly. 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
P. MADDEN, S. RUDKIN 297
Secondly, the profit-maximizing monopolist could have 
chosen the atomistic equilibrium price, but didn’t. Hence 
monopoly profit (aggregate producer surplus) must be 
higher than under atomistic competition. 
Corollary to Proposition 1. When the short-run equi- 
librium price under atomistic competition exceeds that 
under monopoly, aggregate consumer and producer sur-
plus are higher under monopoly. 
3. The Long-Run Model 
The previously exogenous number of goods on offer in 
the market (n) is now endogenised. Throughout market 
expansion effects are assumed to be large, that is 0  . 
Consequently it is possible to develop long-run ana-
logues of Proposition 1 and its Corollary. 
Under atomistic competition, it is assumed that there is 
a large mass of potential entrant firms to the market, each 
of whom face heterogeneous fixed entry costs. Firms 
with lower entry costs enter first, and the increasing 
function f(n) indicates the entry cost for the nth entrant. If 
there are n entrants the market outcome is the short-run 
equilibrium given n from Section 2. The resulting profit 
per firm (gross of the fixed entry cost) is; 
   
 
1
1
vt
v
An
π
1 1
A A
t
n p c Q
vcn v
c
  

    
  ( )n f n   ( )n f n
 
0
d
n

 
 
 
The entry dynamics are that some further firms enter if, 
A , and some firms leave if A . 
Long-run equilibrium under atomistic competition is then 
defined as a locally stable equilibrium of this dynamic 
process. 
π π
In the monopolised market, the monopolist now 
chooses n, as well as the goods’ price. In making its 
choice it attracts fixed costs that are equivalent to those 
in the atomistic market when it provides n goods, namely  
f n n . Given n, the monopolist would choose the  
corresponding short-run price from Section 2, so profits 
(gross of the fixed cost) are; 
   
 
1
1 1
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vv vt Bn
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1
π
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1
M M
t
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v vt c v
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   
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d
n
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( )

 
   
 
The long-run equilibrium under monopoly is then de-
fined to be a global maximum of 
 Π πM Mn n . The long-run possibilities  
are quite rich for a general 
Steady-states of the entry dynamic under atomistic 
competition satisfy    πA n An f n n   
0n
, produc- 
1
0n A  ing 2 solutions,   and . Since 
1
n A  0n,   is unstable, whilst   is locally 
stable. Thus 
1
0An A
  
f n . Here focus is on a 
special case that illustrates the main point adequately, 
namely  f n n , where .  0  
 
  1
0
Π d
n
M n Bn n n
   
 is the unique long-run equi- 
librium under atomistic competition. 
For monopoly,  and so  
   Π 1M n B n n  Π 0M n     . This satisfies   
 when 11 0Mn B       
 
, is increasing to the left 
of this stationary point and decreasing to the right. Thus 
1
1 0Mn B         is the unique global maximum  of Π ,n
0
M  and is the unique long-run equilibrium un-
der monopoly. 
It is straightforward to check that, under the assump-
tion  1B A   ,    and so M An n  . For prices  
1
M A
vt cp c p
v vt 
  
0
 can be shown readily. 
Thus in the long-run (with   
0
, monopoly of- 
fers both lower prices (which do not vary with n) and 
greater variety than atomistic competition.  
The desirable welfare consequences of monopoly in 
the short-run are further enhanced by these long-run va- 
riety consequences. Consumers who enter the atomistic 
market are also in the monopoly market and are made 
better off by the lower monopoly price and greater vari-
ety; the lower monopoly price and greater variety cause 
new consumers to enter, who are also better off under 
monopoly, whilst the remaining consumers enter neither 
market and are indifferent. In the long-run, monopoly is 
again Pareto superior to atomistic competition for con- 
sumers and aggregate consumer surplus is certainly 
higher under monopoly. Secondly, the profit-maximizing 
monopolist could have chosen the atomistic equilibrium 
price and variety, but didn’t. Hence monopoly profit (ag-
gregate producer surplus) must be higher than under at-
omistic competition in the long-run. 
Summarising: 
Proposition 2. In the long-run monopoly model with 
  
gregate social welfare. As usual, the optimal choice of p 
, not only is the equilibrium price lower than 
under atomistic competition, but the extent of variety on 
offer is higher, creating a Pareto improvement for con-
sumers, higher aggregate consumer surplus and higher 
aggregate producer surplus. 
4. The Social Optimum 
A planner now chooses p and n so as to maximize ag-
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will be marginal cost c, in which case the utility of an 
entering consumer and the market size will be; 
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Continuing to assume that the mass of potential con-
sumer entrants is large ( ( )X m c ) aggregate social wel-
fare ( )W n  is then: 
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